General Protections News

At Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers, we specialise in advising and representing both employees and employers in adverse action and general protections claims. Whether you're facing unlawful treatment or defending against it, we offer expert guidance on your rights under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Contact us for tailored legal advice and representation.

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How to Succeed in a General Protections Claim

A general protections claim is one of the most powerful claims available to an employee under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). It is also one of the most commonly misunderstood. Many employees assume that if they made a complaint, and were then dismissed or otherwise mistreated, the law will automatically come to their aid. That is not how the jurisdiction works. A general protections case is not won by indignation. It is won by precision. The task is to identify the workplace right, identify the adverse action, identify the decision maker, and then expose the prohibited reason which animated the conduct. The governing provisions are found principally in Part 3 to 1 of the Act, including sections 340, 341, 342, 351, 360 and 361. A dismissal related claim must generally be filed in the Fair Work Commission within 21 days after the dismissal took effect.

The first requirement is to identify the legal right relied upon. That sounds elementary, but it is where many cases begin to fail. A person does not succeed merely by proving unfairness or unpleasant treatment. The Act protects specific things. Under section 341, a person has a workplace right if the person is entitled to the benefit of a workplace law or industrial instrument, is able to initiate or participate in a process under a workplace law or instrument, or is able to make a complaint or inquiry in relation to employment. If the complaint is not, in truth, a complaint in relation to employment, difficulty arises immediately. If the right is described vaguely or at a level of generality which cannot withstand scrutiny, the case becomes unstable from the beginning. A proper claim requires close attention to exactly what was said, to whom, when, and why it engaged the statute.

The second requirement is to identify the adverse action. Section 342 contains the statutory definition. In the employment context, adverse action includes dismissal, injury in employment, alteration of the employee’s position to the employee’s prejudice, and discrimination between the employee and other employees. There is a tendency among litigants to describe broad courses of conduct as “retaliation” or “punishment” and to leave the matter there. That approach is inadequate. The pleading must identify the act itself. Was the employee dismissed. Was the employee demoted. Was the employee issued a disciplinary warning. Was the employee stripped of duties, reporting lines, hours, or remuneration. Was the employee treated differently in a way that materially prejudiced position or status. A successful case is one in which the adverse action is not rhetorical. It is specific.

The third requirement is to identify the operative decision maker. General protections claims often turn on that question. The law is concerned with why the employer acted. In practice, that means the Court or Commission looks closely at the reasons of the person or persons who made the decision, or in some cases materially influenced it. That is why careless over pleading is dangerous. It is not enough to allege, without discipline, that every manager in the vicinity was involved. If multiple people are pleaded as decision makers or influencers, the evidence must justify the allegation. Otherwise, the claim becomes diffuse, overextended, and vulnerable. The Federal Court’s recent treatment of section 570 costs in Roohizadegan v Technology One Limited (No 7) is a timely reminder that employment litigation can become needlessly complex and costly when allegations multiply far beyond the real issues.

The fourth requirement is to understand the reverse onus properly. Section 361 provides that, where an applicant alleges that action was taken for a particular prohibited reason, that reason is presumed unless the respondent proves otherwise. That is a significant forensic advantage. It is not, however, a substitute for disciplined pleading. The applicant must still identify the relevant workplace right or protected attribute, the adverse action, and the relevant actor. A party who treats section 361 as though it excuses vagueness is usually disappointed. The reverse onus is powerful only when attached to a properly articulated case. It assists good pleading. It does not rescue bad pleading.

The fifth requirement is contemporaneous evidence. In this jurisdiction, documents usually matter more than indignation. Emails, meeting invitations, complaint correspondence, diary notes, performance documents, text messages, payroll records, medical certificates, and internal memoranda often determine whether a case survives. Timing can be important. Timing alone is not enough. But where an employee makes a safety complaint, an underpayment complaint, a complaint about discrimination, a grievance about non compliance with an enterprise agreement, or exercises leave rights, and then shortly thereafter suffers dismissal, disciplinary escalation, demotion, exclusion, or loss of duties, the sequence can become highly persuasive. The point, however, is not simply chronology. The point is that chronology must be tied to proof. The best cases usually involve a chronology supported by documents created before litigation was even contemplated.

The sixth requirement is restraint. A properly run general protections case is usually a confined case. There is a recurrent temptation to plead every workplace slight as a separate contravention, every complaint as a separate workplace right, and every managerial act as a separate adverse action. That temptation should be resisted. Courts do not regard prolixity as a sign of strength. A case which is narrowed to the real conduct in issue, the real rights exercised, and the real decision making process is usually more persuasive than one spread across dozens of allegations which cannot all be proved coherently. The recent Federal Court costs decision referred to above is important for that reason. It illustrates that unreasonable expansion of a case, combined with unreasonable rejection of a genuine compromise, can expose a party to adverse costs notwithstanding section 570.

The seventh requirement is realism as to remedy. A general protections claim is not merely a vehicle for alleging legal wrongdoing. It is a vehicle for obtaining relief. That means the applicant should think from the start about what relief is actually being sought and on what evidentiary basis. In a dismissal related claim, the available remedies in court can include compensation, declarations, injunctions, pecuniary penalties, and in an appropriate case reinstatement or equivalent relief under the Court’s broad remedial powers. That breadth is one reason the jurisdiction is powerful. It is also one reason careless claims can become dangerous. If quantum is inflated beyond what the evidence can sensibly sustain, the claim may lose credibility. If a party pursues a large claim without proper economic basis, that can also become relevant on costs.

The eighth requirement is timing. Dismissal related general protections claims must ordinarily be lodged within 21 days in the Fair Work Commission. That time limit is strict. Delay does not merely threaten jurisdiction. It also threatens proof. Witnesses forget. Documents are deleted, archived, or buried. Managers reconstruct reasons after the fact. The employee who obtains advice early, preserves documents, and identifies the real statutory foundation of the case is almost always in a stronger position than the employee who waits until the narrative has gone stale.
The ninth requirement is to understand what the respondent will say. In many cases, the employer will not deny the chronology. The employer will deny the reason. The employer will say that the decision was made for performance, conduct, restructuring, misconduct, incompatibility, or some other lawful reason. The applicant’s task is therefore not merely to tell a compelling story. The applicant’s task is to expose why the stated reason should not be accepted. That may be done by inconsistency in the documents, implausibility in the explanation, contemporaneous references to the protected conduct, changes in managerial attitude after the complaint, or improbabilities in the asserted decision making process. It is not enough to invite a tribunal simply to distrust the employer. The evidence must create a proper basis to reject the employer’s account.

The final requirement is seriousness. This is not an easy jurisdiction. It is exacting. But employees do succeed where the case is properly framed. The recurring features of a successful claim are usually the same. There is a clearly identified workplace right or protected attribute. There is a clearly identified adverse action. There is disciplined attention to who decided what and when. There is a coherent chronology. There are documents. There is a plausible and focused theory of why the prohibited reason was operative. Above all, there is discipline.

General protections litigation rewards clarity and punishes excess. That is why early legal advice matters. A party who waits too long, pleads too widely, or confuses moral grievance with statutory right usually weakens a claim which might otherwise have had real force. Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers advises employees and employers on the proper framing, prosecution, and defence of general protections claims under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Where dismissal, discipline, demotion, or prejudice follows the exercise of a workplace right, prompt and careful advice is often decisive. 

The Difference Between Unfair Dismissal, General Protections, and Unlawful Termination Under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Employees commonly describe a dismissal as “unfair”, “unlawful”, or “adverse action” as though those expressions mean the same thing. They do not. Under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), unfair dismissal, general protections, and unlawful termination are separate causes of action. Each rests on a different statutory foundation. Each asks a different legal question. Each proceeds through a different procedural path. Each carries different remedies and different forensic consequences. If the wrong jurisdiction is selected at the beginning, the case can be misframed from the outset.
Unfair dismissal is the broad merits based remedy. The central statutory provision is section 385. A person has been unfairly dismissed if the Commission is satisfied that the person was dismissed, that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, that the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code if that Code applies, and that the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy. The accompanying provisions in sections 386 to 389 elaborate those concepts. The central question in an unfair dismissal case is therefore not whether the employer acted for a prohibited reason. The central question is whether, having regard to the statutory criteria, the dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable. That is why unfair dismissal cases often focus on valid reason, procedural fairness, warnings, support person issues, proportionality, redeployment, and whether the employer’s response was out of all proportion to the conduct alleged.

General protections dismissal cases are different in character. They are not centrally concerned with industrial fairness. They are concerned with prohibited reason. Part 3 to 1 protects employees from adverse action because they have workplace rights, have exercised workplace rights, propose to exercise workplace rights, have engaged in industrial activity, or possess particular protected attributes. Sections 340, 341, 342 and 351 are central. A dismissal may be procedurally polished and still contravene Part 3 to 1 if it was taken for a prohibited reason. Conversely, a dismissal may be procedurally clumsy and still not be adverse action if the prohibited reason is not established. That distinction is critical. Unfair dismissal asks whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. General protections asks why the action was taken.

Unlawful termination is different again. It is found in Part 6 to 4 of the Act. Sections 772 to 779 identify particular grounds on which an employee must not be terminated, including temporary absence from work because of illness or injury, union membership or non membership, filing a complaint or participating in proceedings against an employer, and a range of protected personal characteristics. The language overlaps in part with general protections, but the cause of action is distinct. The time limit, procedural mechanism, and statutory formulation differ. It is therefore wrong to treat unlawful termination as merely another label for general protections. It is a separate statutory pathway and must be analysed as such.

The forums are also different. Unfair dismissal claims are determined by the Fair Work Commission. The application is made under section 394. Jurisdictional issues are dealt with under section 396. If the claim succeeds, the Commission may award reinstatement or compensation under sections 390 to 392. By contrast, dismissal related general protections claims ordinarily begin in the Commission under section 365, but the Commission’s role is usually conciliatory rather than determinative. If the matter does not resolve, a certificate may issue, and proceedings may then be brought in court under section 370. Unlawful termination disputes similarly begin with a Commission process under section 773, with unresolved matters capable of proceeding to court under the relevant provisions thereafter. The procedural difference matters. Unfair dismissal is usually resolved in the Commission itself. General protections and unlawful termination commonly proceed beyond the Commission into court litigation if not settled.

Eligibility is another major point of difference. Not every employee can bring unfair dismissal. Section 382 provides that a person must be protected from unfair dismissal. That usually requires completion of the minimum employment period and, unless the person is covered by an award or enterprise agreement or other applicable basis, earnings below the high income threshold. From 1 July 2025 the high income threshold is $183,100, and the compensation cap for unfair dismissal is $91,550. Those figures matter in practice because many senior employees who are too highly paid to access unfair dismissal may still have access to a general protections claim if the facts support prohibited reason.

The remedies are different in a way which often shapes strategy from the beginning. In unfair dismissal, reinstatement is the primary remedy. Compensation is only available if reinstatement is inappropriate. Compensation is also capped by section 392(5). The current Commission benchbook continues to treat reinstatement as primary and to apply the orthodox compensation methodology, including the statutory cap.

General protections claims can produce much broader relief. Because they proceed to court, the available remedies can include declarations, injunctions, compensation, and civil penalties. Compensation is not constrained by the unfair dismissal cap in section 392. That is why general protections proceedings can be significantly more valuable, but also significantly more demanding. The pleading burden is heavier. The litigation process is more formal. The costs risk, while constrained by section 570, is real.
Costs are themselves an important point of distinction. In unfair dismissal, costs are uncommon, though the Commission does have statutory powers in sections 400A and 401 in defined circumstances. In general protections litigation in court, section 570 creates a strong no costs starting point, but it does not abolish costs risk. A party may still be ordered to pay costs if proceedings were instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or where an unreasonable act or omission caused the other side to incur costs. The recent Federal Court decision in Roohizadegan v Technology One Limited (No 7) is a clear reminder that undisciplined litigation conduct can still attract costs in a Fair Work matter.

The choice between these jurisdictions should therefore follow the real complaint. If the employee says, in substance, “there was no valid reason, I was denied procedural fairness, I was not warned, and the dismissal was harsh”, that is often an unfair dismissal case. If the employee says, in substance, “I was dismissed because I made a complaint, took leave, exercised rights under an enterprise agreement, raised safety issues, or because of a protected attribute”, that is often a general protections case. If the dismissal fits one of the specific prohibited grounds in Part 6 to 4, unlawful termination may also arise. Some cases may support more than one path. Some support only one. The exercise is legal, not semantic.

That is why early advice is essential. The choice of jurisdiction determines the structure of the case, the evidence required, the likely remedy, the time limits, and the strategic leverage. Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers advises employees and employers on the correct characterisation of dismissal disputes under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), including whether a matter is properly pursued as unfair dismissal, general protections, unlawful termination, or some combination of statutory and contractual claims. 

Reinstatement in Unfair Dismissal Cases

In unfair dismissal litigation, compensation attracts most of the practical attention. That is understandable. Parties often want a monetary outcome. But the statute does not begin there. Under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), reinstatement is the primary remedy. Section 390 provides that the Fair Work Commission may order a remedy if it is satisfied that a person was protected from unfair dismissal and was unfairly dismissed, but compensation may only be ordered if the Commission is satisfied that reinstatement is inappropriate. That statutory sequence matters. It is not ornamental. It means that, once unfair dismissal is established, the first real question is whether the employee should be put back into employment.

Section 391 then explains what reinstatement means. The Commission may order that the employee be reappointed to the position held immediately before dismissal, or appointed to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than those previously enjoyed. That second limb is important. Employers often attempt to resist reinstatement by saying that the precise former role no longer exists. The Act does not permit that point to be treated as conclusive. The question is not simply whether the same title appears on the current organisational chart. The question is whether there is a position, or can be a position, on terms and conditions no less favourable. The Commission’s current benchbook continues to state that the Commission need not always specify the exact role, and that the employer may be left to choose a compliant position, provided the statutory standard is met.

Why, then, is reinstatement so frequently resisted. The reason is obvious enough. Reinstatement restores the employment relationship. It requires an employer to accept back a person who may have challenged managerial authority, resisted allegations of misconduct, exposed procedural unfairness, or obtained findings critical of the employer’s treatment. It may also require restoration of continuity and, in an appropriate case, payment for lost remuneration between dismissal and reinstatement. In practical terms, reinstatement may be the remedy with the greatest operational impact on an employer. That is exactly why Parliament made it primary. The Act proceeds on the basis that unfair dismissal is not always adequately answered by money.

The most common objection is loss of trust and confidence. Employers frequently assert that the employment relationship has broken down irretrievably. That proposition, however, is not self proving. The Commission has repeatedly emphasised that any claimed loss of trust and confidence must be soundly and rationally based. The current benchbook says the same. It also makes clear that difficulty or embarrassment in taking back an employee is not necessarily enough. Nor is the fact that the employer accused the employee of serious misconduct. The real question is whether sufficient trust and confidence can be restored to make the relationship viable and productive. That inquiry is practical and evidence based. It requires more than assertion.

An employer who says trust is gone must therefore do more than recite the formula. The employer should identify why the relationship is said to be unworkable. Is it because the employee occupied a role requiring unusual confidence or fiduciary sensitivity. Is it because the conduct found at hearing, even if insufficient to justify dismissal, was still serious enough to make ongoing employment impractical. Is it because the conflict has extended to key personnel in a way which would render return unmanageable. Those matters may be relevant. But the Commission scrutinises them carefully. A mere unwillingness to revisit a dismissal is not the same thing as impracticability.

Another common argument is that no position is available. That point also requires care. The current benchbook recognises that, by the time a matter is determined, the exact former position may no longer exist. It further recognises that this fact, without more, is insufficient to establish that reinstatement is inappropriate. The absence of a vacancy is a factor. It is not an answer. Especially in larger enterprises, the Commission may be sceptical of a broad assertion that there is simply nowhere for the employee to go. If another role can be identified on terms and conditions no less favourable, the statutory preference for reinstatement remains engaged.

Incapacity is a further recognised reason why reinstatement may be inappropriate. If an employee is medically unable to perform the inherent requirements of the position, and if modified duties are not practically or reasonably available, reinstatement may not be appropriate. The benchbook identifies a number of relevant matters. Those include the terms of the contract, the actual duties performed before dismissal, the extent to which incapacity prevents fulfilment of inherent requirements, the practicality of modified work arrangements, the likelihood of recovery, and whether accommodating the employee would impose an unreasonable burden on the employer or on other employees. That is a nuanced inquiry. It is not satisfied merely because the employee has an illness or injury.

There is also the category of case where reinstatement would almost certainly produce immediate further dismissal. If, for example, facts later discovered would plainly justify termination, or if the employee can no longer lawfully occupy the position, the Commission may conclude that reinstatement would serve no real purpose. Even there, however, the analysis remains careful. The Commission asks whether reinstatement is inappropriate, not whether it would be inconvenient or unwelcome.

From the employee’s perspective, it is important to decide whether reinstatement is genuinely sought. That question should be answered early. A person who truly wants the job back should ordinarily say so clearly and consistently. That intention should sit comfortably with the evidence. If the employee has already moved on to a new role, relocated, or taken steps inconsistent with any genuine desire to return, the claim for reinstatement may be weakened. Conversely, where an employee plainly wishes to resume the role and there is evidence that the working relationship can be restored, the statutory preference for reinstatement should not be surrendered too readily.
From the employer’s perspective, resistance to reinstatement should be evidenced, not stylised. If trust and confidence is said to be lost, the reasons should be set out rationally. If no role is available, the organisational evidence should be clear. If incapacity is relied upon, the issue should be analysed against the inherent requirements of the role and the practical burden of any modification. Unsupported formulas are rarely as persuasive as employers suppose.

The larger point is straightforward. Reinstatement remains central to unfair dismissal law. It is not a relic. It is not merely a theoretical preference recited before the case turns to money. It is the primary statutory remedy. Parties who do not engage seriously with it risk misunderstanding the structure of the jurisdiction. Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers advises on unfair dismissal claims in which reinstatement is contested, including cases involving alleged misconduct, breakdown in working relationships, restructuring, redundancy, and medical incapacity. Where reinstatement is realistically available, it can provide a remedy far more significant than compensation alone. 

Calculating Compensation for Unfair Dismissal

Compensation for unfair dismissal is often spoken about as though it were a broad discretionary payment for being treated badly. That is not correct. The remedy is structured, statutory, and constrained. It does not become available unless the Fair Work Commission is first satisfied that reinstatement is inappropriate. Even then, the Commission is not at large. Section 392 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) sets the framework. The Commission’s current unfair dismissals benchbook continues to summarise the orthodox approach by reference to the well known Sprigg methodology, as refined by later authority such as Bowden.

The first step is to estimate what the employee would have received had the dismissal not occurred. That is often described as the anticipated period of employment. It is not an invitation to speculate indefinitely. The Commission must make a practical estimate, based on the evidence, of how long the employment would probably have continued but for the dismissal. In some cases, the answer may be measured in weeks. In others, months. In some cases, particularly where the employee had lengthy service, a stable role, and no sign of imminent change, the period may be longer. The assessment is evaluative, but it must still be reasoned. The Commission does not simply pick a figure because it feels just. It must estimate the period of likely continued employment on the evidence available.

That first step is often where the real contest lies. Employers will commonly say that the employee’s future was uncertain in any event, whether because of performance concerns, organisational change, fixed funding, interpersonal conflict, or the likelihood of lawful termination for some other reason. Applicants will commonly say the opposite. The Commission’s task is to determine what would probably have happened in the real world. That makes contemporaneous evidence very important. Performance reviews, restructure proposals, budgets, warnings, emails, and managerial planning can all affect the likely period. A compensation case cannot be run properly without close attention to those matters.

The second step is to deduct remuneration earned after dismissal during that anticipated period. If the employee obtains alternative employment, those earnings will usually be deducted. Workers compensation payments are also generally treated as remuneration for this purpose. Social security payments are not generally treated as remuneration and are ordinarily not deducted. The reason is that section 392 is concerned with compensation for lost remuneration, not with transferring the burden of Commonwealth benefits into the employer’s favour. The Commission benchbook continues to explain the distinction in those terms.

Closely allied to that step is mitigation. The dismissed employee is expected to take reasonable steps to reduce loss. That does not mean the employee must accept any role at any pay. It does mean that a party seeking compensation should ordinarily be able to explain what steps were taken to find work, when those steps were taken, and why replacement employment was or was not obtained. Job applications, recruiter correspondence, rejection emails, and evidence of labour market conditions can all become important. An employee who does little, or who cannot explain prolonged inactivity, may face a reduction for failure to mitigate.

The third step is contingencies. This is not a mechanical discount. It is an evaluative deduction for the possibility that some event may have altered earning capacity or employment continuity during the relevant period. The Sprigg case famously used a 25 per cent discount, but the benchbook is careful to explain that the figure was tied to the facts of that case and is not a universal rule. Contingencies can cut both ways. They may include the prospect of resignation, lawful dismissal, illness, restructure, loss of work, or, conversely, favourable developments. The Commission must exercise broad discretion. It is not engaging in mathematics for its own sake. It is trying to reach an amount which realistically reflects the probable economic consequence of the unfair dismissal.

The fourth step concerns taxation. The Commission usually seeks to avoid distorting the real economic position by ignoring tax. Broadly put, the exercise involves considering what the employee would have received net of tax had the remuneration been paid in the ordinary course, and then accounting for the tax treatment of the compensation order itself. The benchbook continues to describe the issue in that way. Although taxation does not dominate every hearing, it can materially affect the final figure and should not be overlooked where the sum is significant.

The fifth step is the statutory cap. This is often decisive. Section 392(5) provides that the amount ordered must not exceed the lesser of 26 weeks’ remuneration and half the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal. From 1 July 2025 the high income threshold is $183,100 and the unfair dismissal compensation cap is therefore $91,550. Even where actual loss would otherwise exceed that figure, the Commission cannot award more than the cap. This is not a discretionary matter. It is a statutory ceiling.

That cap has practical consequences well before any hearing. It affects settlement strategy from the beginning. Many dismissed employees, particularly those in well paid roles, assume that the Commission can award a broad measure of income loss. That is not so. A party may have suffered a far greater financial disruption than the cap permits the Commission to compensate. That does not make the unfair dismissal claim valueless. It does, however, mean that expectations must be brought into line with the legislation.

There are further statutory constraints. Compensation under section 392 cannot include a component for shock, distress, humiliation, or analogous non economic loss. The benchbook continues to state that the Commission can only compensate for lost remuneration. That is an important distinction. Applicants sometimes describe the emotional harm caused by a dismissal in entirely understandable terms. But the unfair dismissal compensation jurisdiction is not a general damages jurisdiction. Different statutory claims may address different forms of loss. Section 392 is directed to remuneration lost because reinstatement is inappropriate.

Contributory misconduct can also reduce compensation. Section 392 requires the Commission to consider whether misconduct contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss. Even where the dismissal is unfair overall, because for example the process was seriously flawed or the response disproportionate, some misconduct may still justify a reduction in compensation. This is a point often overlooked by applicants who assume that proving unfairness will automatically produce a substantial award. It will not. The Commission’s task is to arrive at an amount that is fair, appropriate, and compliant with the statute.

For applicants, the lesson is that compensation cases should be built evidentially. Payslips, contracts, bonus history, likely future employment evidence, job search records, and any documents relevant to contingencies should be gathered early. For employers, the lesson is that compensation should never be treated as an automatic maximum cap case. Often it is not. The period of likely continued employment may have been short. Replacement work may have been found quickly. Misconduct may justify reduction. Reinstatement may remain available. Each of those matters can materially affect the range.

Compensation for unfair dismissal is therefore not a vague exercise in industrial sympathy. It is a structured assessment with statutory limits. Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers advises on unfair dismissal compensation, including anticipated period analysis, mitigation, contingencies, statutory caps, and realistic settlement valuation. A carefully prepared compensation case is often the difference between a modest result and a properly reasoned one. 

Costs in General Protections Cases

There is a persistent misconception in Fair Work litigation that costs are of little real consequence because the jurisdiction is “no costs”. That is only partly true. Section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) does create an important departure from the ordinary civil rule that costs follow the event. But it does not abolish costs risk. It does not protect a party who litigates irresponsibly. It does not give licence to over plead, overrun, or refuse sensible compromise without consequence. In general protections litigation, costs remain a significant strategic consideration.

Section 570 begins from a protective premise. Parliament has long recognised that employment litigation often involves a marked disparity of resources. If ordinary costs rules applied with full force, many arguable claims and defences would never be brought. The section therefore provides that a party may only be ordered to pay costs in defined circumstances, including where proceedings were instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or where an unreasonable act or omission caused the other side to incur costs. That protective structure is deliberate. It seeks to prevent the fear of adverse costs from stifling access to justice in employment disputes.
But the protection is not absolute. The first relevant category is proceedings instituted vexatiously. That usually connotes an abuse of process, improper purpose, or proceedings pursued not to vindicate a real legal right but to harass, oppress, or burden the other side. Such cases are relatively uncommon, but the category remains important because it makes clear that section 570 does not protect proceedings brought for an improper end.

The second category is proceedings instituted without reasonable cause. That does not mean merely that the claim ultimately failed. A great many arguable claims fail. The question is whether, viewed at the time of commencement, the proceeding was so lacking in legal or factual foundation that it had no reasonable basis. Courts are cautious with the concept, because section 570 is meant to preserve access to justice. Even so, a plainly untenable claim can expose the party who brought it to costs. The same is true, in principle, of a plainly untenable defence.

The third category is often the most important in practice. Costs may be ordered where a party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other side to incur costs. That focuses attention not merely on whether the case was arguable at the beginning, but on how it was conducted. A claim may be arguable when filed and still become a vehicle for unreasonable litigation conduct later. Conversely, a party may lose a hard fought but properly run case and yet remain protected by section 570. The distinction is critical. Costs in this jurisdiction often turn not on defeat, but on unreasonable conduct.

What, then, constitutes unreasonable conduct. The answer depends on the facts, but some themes recur. A party may act unreasonably by maintaining allegations after the evidence has shown them to be untenable. A party may act unreasonably by refusing to confine the issues despite repeated opportunities to do so. A party may act unreasonably by causing adjournments, by failing to comply with case management directions, by persisting with extravagant quantum claims without proper basis, or by rejecting a genuine settlement offer when no realistic path to a better outcome remains. Those are not abstract risks. They are real.

The recent Federal Court decision in Roohizadegan v Technology One Limited (No 7) is a strong illustration. The Court made costs orders under section 570 after concluding that the applicant had engaged in unreasonable conduct, including unreasonable failure to compromise following a substantial Calderbank offer of $2.2 million made mid trial. The Court treated the offer, and the broader manner in which the litigation had been run, as sufficient to engage the discretion. That matters for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that section 570 does not neutralise settlement dynamics. Secondly, it demonstrates that courts will examine how a case was conducted, not merely how it ended.

The significance of Calderbank offers in this field should not be understated. A reasonable offer to compromise, made in clear terms and with a proper warning as to costs, can assume major importance if rejected unreasonably. The fact that the jurisdiction begins with a no costs rule does not prevent the Court from treating rejection of such an offer as an unreasonable omission under section 570. The assessment is objective. The question is whether, in the circumstances then known, the refusal to accept the offer was unreasonable. Timing matters. The state of the evidence matters. The realistic prospect of achieving a better result matters.
There is a wider forensic lesson here. General protections claims often attract broad and ambitious pleadings. There may be multiple alleged workplace rights, multiple alleged complaints, multiple adverse actions, and multiple managers said to have been involved. Sometimes that is justified. Sometimes it is not. The danger is that a case which begins with a legitimate core can become swollen by allegations which add complexity but not strength. When that occurs, legal costs increase, hearing time expands, and the prospect of a later costs application correspondingly grows. Section 570 protects parties who litigate genuine disputes. It does not indemnify parties against the consequence of turning a focused dispute into an unmanageable one.
For applicants, the practical message is restraint. The case should be pleaded carefully, reviewed regularly, and narrowed where appropriate. Exaggeration in the statement of claim, or in the quantum case, may create more risk than leverage. Settlement offers should be considered soberly and by reference to the actual state of the evidence, not merely the applicant’s aspirational best case. For respondents, the practical message is that section 570 should not induce passivity. Where the applicant’s conduct is truly unreasonable, costs exposure may be real. A carefully timed Calderbank offer, and a well kept record of how the litigation burden has been increased by the other side’s conduct, can become highly important.

The policy of section 570 remains clear and valuable. Parties should not be discouraged from bringing or defending genuine Fair Work claims merely by fear of ordinary adverse costs. But the section does not remove discipline from the system. A party who litigates unreasonably can still pay dearly. Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers advises on the conduct, prosecution, defence, and settlement of general protections claims, including costs exposure under section 570 and the strategic use of Calderbank offers. In a jurisdiction where parties often assume costs are peripheral, careful advice on costs risk can materially alter the course of the case. 

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Contract Disputes

We advise on employment and contractor contract disputes, including breaches, interpretation issues, and enforcement of contractual rights.

general protections lawyers
General Protections Disputes

We defend your rights in general protections disputes, offering strategic solutions to safeguard your workplace.

deed of release lawyers
Deed of Release Preparation

We draft or negotiate Deed of Release agreements, ensuring clear terms that protect your legal and financial interests.

Contact Us

Get in touch
  • Phone: +61 0450 491 637
  • Email: ph@benthamlegal.com.au

  • Address:
  • Unit 29/15 Valediction Road, Kings Park NSW 2148
  • Working hours:
  • 8:00AM - 7:30PM

Got Questions?

Determining whether you have a valid general protections claim involves a careful analysis of the circumstances surrounding your situation. If you believe that adverse action has been taken against you because you exercised a workplace right—such as making a complaint, requesting flexible work arrangements, or engaging in industrial activities—it’s essential to seek expert legal advice. At Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers, our experienced team will conduct a thorough assessment of your case, considering the specific facts and evidence. We will provide clear guidance on whether you have grounds for a claim and outline the steps needed to move forward.

If you suspect that your employer has engaged in adverse action against you, it is crucial not to hesitate. Immediate action can be vital in preserving your rights. Contact Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers as soon as possible. Our team will offer you expert legal advice tailored to your situation, helping you understand your rights and options. We will guide you in documenting relevant incidents and gathering evidence, which is essential for building a strong case. By acting promptly, you can ensure that your concerns are addressed effectively and your rights are protected.

Absolutely. You can file a general protections claim while still employed if you believe you are facing adverse action. This situation can be particularly sensitive, as it may affect your ongoing employment relationship. At Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers, we understand the complexities involved in such cases. Our dedicated team will work closely with you to ensure your claim is handled discreetly and professionally. We will develop a strategy that protects your interests while addressing the adverse action you are experiencing, enabling you to pursue justice without compromising your position at work.

Employers found to have taken adverse action against an employee can face serious legal consequences. These may include orders for compensation, which can cover lost wages, emotional distress, and any other losses incurred due to the adverse action. Additionally, the employer may suffer reputational damage that could impact their business and relationships with other employees. It is imperative for employers to understand their obligations under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and to consult with legal experts. At Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers, we provide comprehensive guidance to employers, helping them navigate their responsibilities and avoid potential pitfalls.

At Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers, our team is dedicated to meticulously preparing your general protections claim. We start by conducting a thorough investigation into your case, gathering all relevant evidence, and reviewing documentation such as employment contracts and workplace policies. Our solicitors will draft all necessary legal documents with precision, ensuring that your claim is compelling and well-structured. We will also represent you in any discussions or negotiations with your employer or their representatives. Our commitment is to advocate fiercely on your behalf, striving to achieve the best possible outcome for your case.

Choosing Bentham Sydney Employment Lawyers means you are enlisting the support of a team that is not only knowledgeable in employment law but also deeply committed to protecting your rights. Our solicitors have extensive experience in handling adverse action and general protections claims, ensuring that you receive expert guidance throughout the process. We prioritise open communication, keeping you informed every step of the way. Our goal is to achieve justice for you while providing compassionate support during what can be a challenging time. Don’t wait to protect your rights—contact us today for a confidential consultation to discuss your legal options.